The rapid development and deployment of vehicle technologies offer opportunities to rethink intersection operations. This paper capitalizes on vehicle connectivity and proposes a cooperative framework for allocating priority at intersections. Similar to free markets, our framework allows vehicles to trade their time based on their (disclosed) value of time. We design the framework based on transferable utility games, where winners (time buyers) pay losers (time sellers) in each game. Our cooperative framework is compatible with a variety of existing control methods, it drives travelers to estimate their value of time correctly, and naturally dissuades travelers from attempting to cheat.
Introduction
Intersection are the bottlenecks of a city's traffic network. The interaction between multiple conflicting streams of traffic at intersections presents safety, efficiency, and environmental challenges. To address these challenges, intersection controllers schedule the priorities of different traffic streams in a way that optimizes one or more operational metrics. In this context, compared to a traditional vehicle (TV) environment, a system consisting of connected vehicles (CVs) can collect and utilize more detailed data and exchange information between vehicles efficiently. This creates opportunities to rethink the way intersections are controlled.
Efficient operation is sometimes achieved by accounting for heterogeneity in the vehicle population, e.g., different vehicle classes have different capacity conversion factors [52] . Control tools should take this into account when efficiency is sought. Similarly, priority can vary depending on whether a vehicle is on a major street or minor street at an intersection. To promote transit, one prioritizes vehicles with larger numbers of passengers and distinguished vehicles by trip purpose, e.g., high-occupancy vehicle lanes and bus-only lanes [17, 22, 29, 46, 47] . Considering different travel time requirements, toll lanes are designed to allow paying vehicles to go faster. But such toll lanes are usually expensive [14] and they typically do not apply tiered pricing for different travelers because of limited lane resources.
Equipped with a mobile wireless communication device, a CV is able to communicate with adjacent CVs, infrastructure (V2I), and even the Internet quickly and frequently. This allows for exchange of information about the number of passengers, trip purpose, and value of time (VOT). Control tools, in turn, can use such rich information to schedule vehicles through the intersection in ways that account for the heterogeneous characteristics of the vehicles, e.g., transit signal priority in a CV environment [29] . Transit signal progression for CVs [29] ; optimized discharge sequences [28, 68] ; CACC [74, 75] ; multi-scale perimeter control [69] ; adaptive phases [31] ; multi-agent scheduling [32] ; cumulative travel time responsive [37] ; bi-level optimization with adaptive phases [19] ; combined trajectory and signal timing [42] ; reservation with first come first served [15, 16, 61] ; cooperative games [73] ; correlated equilibrium [1] ; Cournot Reservation-based intersection control [63] ; intersection auctions for AVs [10, 39] ; ∆-tolling scheme for network control [58] Efficiency + comfort
Number of stops and acceleration
Optimized discharge sequences [28, 68] ; deceleration optimization with cooperation [27] ; non-cooperative games (chicken game formation) with Nash equilibrium [18] Combined index Rolling-horizon with optimization of delays + stops + Inspired by toll lanes, research has emerged on tolling intersections for CVs, e.g., auction-based intersection operations. When passing an "auctionrequired" intersection, vehicles need to auction their passing rights with others from conflicting traffic streams based on their valuated delay or travel time [10, 39, 63] . Tiered pricing can also be indirectly realized.
In practice, the real bidders in such auctions should be computer programs, because travelers cannot react fast enough when facing different possible passing sequences. But in order to represent the travelers, vehicles will need to be knowledgeable of the travelers' VOT (what they are willing to pay for unit time saving). As VOTs vary from person to person and from trip to trip, it can only be evaluated by the travelers themselves. Consequently, the programs cannot know whether the announced VOT is true or not. Considering intersections as queuing systems, vehicles in the same stream have a common benefit to some degree. When a vehicle tries to substantially underestimate its own VOT, the other vehicles in the same queue will indirectly pay for it to pass. With a large probability, the vehicle can also pass the intersection with a much lower payment and a small (but acceptable) delay. Over a long period, it would seem that such an auction encourages vehicles to underestimate VOT as other vehicles catch on to the scheme. Furthermore, such intersections cannot deal with the [70] non-participants, if regulation allows them to not participate in the auction. This transaction system will degrade rapidly due to the asymmetric information about VOT, which is similar Akerlof's market for "lemons" [2] .
This paper proposes a new cooperative framework for allocating priority at intersections. Vehicles with heterogeneous VOTs can engage in trading priority for direct monetary compensation, i.e., they can sell or buy time from the others. We design a game framework that is based on transferable utility (TU) games to operate the system. Vehicles need only provide their VOT information to the system at the time of participation in the game. This facilitates quick and simple transactions, which is needed in the context of real-time intersection operations. The proposed framework is compatible with existing control techniques and can, therefore, be viewed as a complementary framework, one that is meant to improve upon aspects of existing control frameworks, not compete with them. This paper extends our previous work on transferable utility games for intersection control [43] in the following ways: 1) We outline that three popular control methods that are compatible with our game framework. 2) We apply our game framework to more complex intersection layouts in our experiments. 3) We further explore the feasibility that travelers defraud our game framework in one of our experiments. The next section reviews rele-vant literature, namely VOT and intersection control, mainly for a CV environment. The following section outlines the proposed approach and how it can be incorporated with some existing control methods. This is followed by simulation experiments, and the last section concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Intersection Control for Connected Vehicles
Researchers have proposed various optimization objectives to improve intersection performance for CVs. Delay minimization is the most widely applied objective in intersection control [1, 8, 9, 15, 16, 19, 23, 28, 29, 32, 42, 61, 68, 69, 73] , and it can be simply calculated as the difference between real-speed travel time and free-flow-speed travel time. Moreover, minimizing personal delay can be seen as an implicit objective for reservation-based systems, such as first-in-first-out systems [15, 61] . Other papers minimized travel time or maximized travel speed, which are (in essence) equivalent to minimizing delay [31, 37, 58, 72] .
Other recent approaches focus on minimizing queue sizes [3, 11, 19] . Both traditional actuated control techniques and recent decentralized control approaches can be seen as falling in this category as well [24-26, 40, 54, 62, 66, 67] . Fuel consumption is also a common optimization index [33, 41, 53, 71] , which combines environmental considera-tions with economic efficiency and resource utilization. When considering both efficiency and comfort, number-of-stops or acceleration/deceleration are useful indices [18, 27, 28, 68] . Other approaches have focused on safety, e.g., Lu et al. [45] set collision-avoidance as the goal and performed field tests using a rule-based control algorithm. Other researchers applied multi-objective techniques for intersection optimization [23, 35].
Value of Time (VOT)
The approaches above all treat vehicles as homogeneous units. VOT serves as measure of heterogeneity among the vehicles at an intersection. It captures what different drivers are willing to pay for for travel time savings and has been investigated for more than half a century [5, 6, 48, 65] . In the past 20 years, studies of VOT were specialized to different parts of the world such as Japan [34] , California [7] , The United Kingdom [64] , Germany [13], Denmark [21] and Europe in general [59] . Also, Jara-Daz and Small et al. reviewed models for VOT in their books [30, 60] .
Recent papers have used VOT weighted delay for intersection control. Specifically, Vasirani and Sascha [63] and Carlino et al.
[10] applied reservation-based intersection control models and Levin and Stephen [39] used tile-based reservation to simulate network dynamic assignment under user equilibrium and Schepperle and Klemens [56, 57] used valuated delay for intersection operations.
Papers of intersection optimization with different indices are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 summarizes intersection approaches that use game theory. We also refer to [55] for a recent survey.
TU-based Intersection Operation

Transferable Utility (TU) Game Framework
The control algorithm applies a cooperative game theory framework using a TU game similar to [44] . We describe this next.
The TU game and side payments
Consider an intersection game between two conflicting vehicle groups A and B. We will envisage A and B as two players. The payoff to A is A mn when
Here, we assume that action m = 1 is preferred by vehicle group A and n = 1 to be preferred by B, while m = 2 and n = 2 are the "disliked" actions by A and B, respectively. We define
as the payoff matrices to A and B, respectively. The TU game is a cooperative game, which allows side payment from one player to another. The feasible set for this TU game is the convex hull of the points (A mn − σ, B mn + σ), where σ ∈ R denotes the side payment. We adopt the convention that σ > 0 corresponds to a side payment made from A to B while σ < 0 represents a side payment made from B to A. Let ω mn denote the total payoff that can be achieved by players A and B under action (m, n), that is, ω mn = (A mn − σ) + (B mn + σ) = A mn + B mn . Hence, in the presence of side payment, rationality dictates that the action chosen is that which maximizes the total payoff:
Denote the maximal payoff by ω * , then
In the absence of agreement, A and B chose mixed strategies that ensure guaranteed payoffs independent of the other player's strategy. This is known as the threat strategy. Let p ≡ [p 1 − p] denote A's threat strategy and let q ≡ [q 1 − q] denote B's threat strategy. Here p is the probability that A chooses their preferred action m = 1 and q is the probability that B chooses their preferred action n = 1. It follows that the expected payoff received by A under their threat strategy is S A ≡ p Aq and B's expected payoff under their threat strategy is
The solution to the TU game is one such that A accepts no less than S A in expected payoff and B accepts no less than S B . This defines two extreme points along the pareto-optimal frontier with payoff pairs (S A , ω * − S A ) and (ω * − S B , S B ). Any convex combination of these two points is a TU solution and, particularly, the midway point constitutes a natural compromise [49] . The resulting payoff is
so that the side payment from A to B is given by
Similarly, our analysis implies that
Subtracting (5) from (7), we get
which is true by definition, see (3). This demonstrates consistency and provides justification for choosing the midway point (the natural compromise) solution to the TU game.
Threat strategy
To determine the threat strategies of A and B, first note that since their average payoffs are 1
finding the threat strategy can be described as a zero sum game with payoff matrix A − B. If a saddle-point exists, the threat point corresponds to the saddle-point: the (m, n) pair for which max m min n (A mn − B mn ) = min n max m (A mn − B mn ).
Otherwise, the solution is simply an optimal twoperson zero-sum game mixed strategy. In this game, A selects their strategy, p, in a way that they are guaranteed the same (expected) payoff regardless of whether B chooses n = 1 or n = 2. Similarly, B selects a strategy that guarantees the same (expected) payoff regardless of whether A chooses m = 1 or m = 2. As such, A chooses a strategy p that renders B indifferent between choosing n = 1 or n = 2. Under p, player B's expected utility given n = 1 (i.e., given they choose n = 1 with probability q = 1) is
Their expected utility given n = 2 (i.e, when q = 0) is
For player B to be indifferent between between these two choices, player A's threat strategy should render (10) and (11) equal. We get,
Similarly, player B chooses their threat strategy q in such a way that player A is indifferent between m = 1 and m = 2. Under q, player A's expected utility from given m = 1 is
and player A's expected utility given m = 2 is
For player A to be indifferent between choosing m = 1 or m = 2, player B's threat strategy should render (13) and (14) equal. Hence,
The threat point follows immediately. In instances where the solutions (12) or (15) would return negative values, one may resort to the linear programming solution of the zero-sum mixed strategy game. Specifically, letting C ≡ A − B denote the payoff matrix, one solves
using linear programming techniques. It is well known that the dual problem produces the solution p for player A.
Vehicle Grouping and Payoff Formulation
Vehicle groups
We generally group vehicles in accordance with whether there exists opportunities to improve travel time through the intersection. We also allow for vehicles not to be involved in the intersection game. We simply set the VOT for these vehicles to zero. Suppose there are n vehicles along the inbound links at the intersection (all approaches) at time t, and they are ordered in ascending order of arrival times, {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let time t marks an instant at which the signal controller updates its strategy. The update cadence can be uniform (e.g., every 10 seconds), triggered by a vehicle arrival (via communication between the vehicle and the controller), or a sensor actuation. We denote by S(t) the control strategy at time t, prior to the update and denote the new strategy by S * (t). Let t t,v denote the discharge time of vehicle v ∈ {1, . . . , n} according to strategy S(t) and denote the associated vehicle discharge vector by T(t) ≡ [t t,1 . . . t t,n ] . Similarly, the discharge vector under the updated control strategy is denoted by T * (t) ≡ [t * t,1 . . . t * t,n ] . Define the time difference vector ∆T t ≡ T t − T * t , which will include non-negative elements and non-positive elements (due to possible re-ordering of vehicles in the discharge sequence). Let ∆τ t,v denote the travel time gain of vehicle v at time t; in other words, ∆τ t,v is the element of the vector ∆T(t) corresponding to vehicle v:
We define the sets A and B in accordance with whether their travel times improve (payers) or worsen (payees), respectively. We also explicitly exclude vehicles in the system that are not part of the game. The latter are assumed to have zero VOT. Let Υ v denote the VOT of vehicle v, then
and
Note that A ∩ B = ∅. Fig. 1 illustrates how the two groups are selected. The discharge times of the vehicles are enclosed in brackets. Under the old control strategy in Fig. 1 (a) , the eastbound through and left-turning vehicles are discharged first, followed by the westbound left-turning vehicles. After the control update, the control strategy shown in Fig. 1 (b) , where the eastbound and westbound left-turning vehicles are discharged first, followed by the eastbound through vehicles. For this update, there are two vehicles whose discharge times decrease (red), and two vehicles whose discharge times increase (green).
Modeling Payoffs
We define the gains to vehicle groups A and B associated with the updated strategy S * (t) as
respectively. Note that G A > 0 and G B < 0. As such, group A prefers the new control strategy S * (t), while group B prefers the prior control strategy, S(t).
Following the definitions in Section 3.1, we have the action pairs (S * (t), S(t)), (S * (t), S * (t)), (S(t), S(t)), and (S(t), S * (t)). We use the gains defined above as the payoffs to the vehicle groups when there is no conflict.
The action pairs (S * (t), S(t)) and (S(t), S * (t)) correspond to conflicts. In these two cases, we assume that a controller breaks the conflict by applying a randomized strategy: it selects S * (t) with probability 0.5 and S(t) with probability 0.5. Then, the expected payoffs for (m, n) = (S * (t), S(t)) and (m, n) = (S(t), S * (t)) are set to zero and we have that
Hence,
For this matrix, it can be immediately demonstrated that a saddle-point exists, since max m min n (A mn − B mn ) = min n max m (A mn − B mn ) = 0, and the threat-point is the action pair (m, n) = (1, 1).
Allocation of side payment
The total side payment from A to B, σ, is immediately calculated using (5) (or (7)). The side payment is divided between the vehicles in the game in proportion to their gains. Let σ v denote the side payment made by vehicle v. Then,
According to (24) , if σ > 0, every vehicle in A makes a positive side payment, and every vehicle in B "makes" a negative side payment (i.e., receives a payment). If σ < 0, payments are made from vehicles in B to vehicles in A.
Control Strategy
The proposed TU game framework can be combined with various control strategies. In this section, we show how the proposed framework can be combined with three existing control techniques, a phase switching method and a reservation-based control strategy (for isolated intersections), and a max-weight based approach for a network-wide decentralized controller.
Phase Switching
Without loss of generality, consider the example intersection layout in Fig. 2 , which is an isolated three-lane four-leg intersection with four through movements and four left-turning movements. For this intersection there are only eight possible movement combination, which are illustrated by the phasing schemes shown in Fig. 3 . To ensure that all movements are serviced, the eight phases can be divided into two signal control groups: a signal cycle that includes phases 1 -4 and a signal cycle that includes phases 5 -8. The phases can be sequenced in numerous ways for each of these two cycles. The sequences can be pre-set, based on sensor actuation, or an adaptive controller. Suppose the cycle length is fixed and let P = {π 1 , . . . , π |P | } denote the set of permutations of phases that constitute a cycle, where π i represents one such sequence of phases (of pre-defined length). The departure times and the travel time gains also depend on the phase sequence, π. To capture this, we write the travel time gains as functions of π: ∆τ t,v (π). At decision time t, the control strategy is simply one that selects a phase sequence as follows:
This can be interpreted as a control strategy which maximizes the VOT-weighted travel time gains of all vehicles in the systems. The strategy covers an entire cycle, but the updates can take place on a finer cadence, e.g., the control strategy can be reevaluated at the end of each individual phase or even after a pre-set minimum green time. This is similar to a control strategy with a rolling horizon.
Reservation-Based Control
A reservation-based control system optimizes individual vehicle discharge times (and trajectories in the case of AVs). The control updates are carried out every time a new vehicle enters the system. Suppose there are n vehicles along the inbound links at the intersection (all approaches), and a new vehicle enters the system at time t. Here, S(t) is the optimized control strategy prior to the arrival of new vehicle with the new vehicle processed last in the sequence, that is, it is assigned the index n + 1 and the discharge times are T(t) = [t t,1 · · · t t,n t t,n+1 ] . The updated strategy S * (t) is one that selects a discharge sequence of the n + 1 vehicles which maximizes the total VOT-weighted travel time gains. Let P (n + 1) ⊆ 2 n+1 denote the set of admissible permutations of the n + 1 vehicles. By admissible, we mean to preclude sequences that involve impossible over-taking (for example). Similar to the phase switching control example above, the updated strategy can be chosen as follows:
where we have emphasized dependence of the travel time gains on the chosen permutation. The overall control process for both the phase switching control and the reservation-based control methods described above can be summarized by the flowchart given in Fig. 4 .
Note that neither of these two methods scales to large networks computationally. Computing optimal strategies is only possible if these control techniques are applied in a decentralized way. This motivates the next control strategy, which is decentralized but comes with network-wide performance guarantees. Determine S * (t) and T * (t) Is S * (t) better than S(t)? 
Max-Weight Control
This approach can be seen as a generalization of the phase switching approach described above. In this example, the updated strategy represents the next phase to select at each intersection in the network. Let L and J denote the sets of network links and network junctions, respectively. With slight notation abuse, let P j = {π j i } denote the set of phases that can be selected at junction j, M j the set of movements across junction j, and M the set of all network movements. Each phase π j i consists of a set of non-conflicting movements in M j .
Let Q a,b (t) denote the size of the vehicle queue along link a that is destined to link b and consider the Lyapunov function
where [·] + ≡ max{0, ·}, π = [π 1 · · · π j · · · π |J | ] is a vector of junction phases, and w a,b (t, π j ) is a movement weight. Let V a,b (t) denote the set of vehicles in the queue at link a destined to link b at time t,
then the movement weights are calculated as
Let φ a,b (t, π j ) denote the vehicle flux from link a to link b if phase π j is active and define the weight
where r b,c is the fraction of vehicles in link b that are destined to link c. Finally, the max-weight decentralized control strategy is given, for each j ∈ J , by (30) where S * j (t) is the updated strategy for junction j. It can be demonstrated analytically that ensures traffic stability at the network level by applying Lyapunov drift techniques [50, 51] , using the Lyapunov function (27) .
Numerical Experiments
Performance Tests
To test the proposed approach, we perform simulation experiments on a hypothetical three-lane four-leg intersection (shown in Fig. 2) . We use the reservation-based control method in this experiment. The minimum time headway for vehicles is set to 1.8 seconds and we use a log-normal distribution to generate vehicle VOTs. We assume a mean VOT of 14.1Euro/h [4] and a standard deviation of 9Euro/h. The cumulative distribution function of VOTs is shown in Fig. 5 .
Vehicle inter-arrival times in our experiment follow a negative exponential distribution with different rates for different experiments. For experiments with large arrival rates, we allow vehicles to queue outside of the intersection; such vehicles are not considered in the control calculations (they are treated as being outside of the system from the controller's perspective). To analyze the performance of the proposed technique, we utilize a "benefit" metric denoted β v . We benchmark against a first-come-first-serve plan: Define the time saved by vehicle v as their travel time under a first-come-first-serve plan less their travel time using the proposed approach. Denote the time saved by vehicle v by τ s v ∈ R. Vehicle v's benefit is given by
We also define another metric based on delay, which we refer to as loss. Denote by λ v the loss to vehicle v. This is given by
where τ d v ≥ 0 is vehicle v's delay, defined here as their travel time less their free-flow (unobstructed) travel time. Fig. 6 shows two contour plots of benefit with varying VOTs and intersection volumes. Fig. 6(a) shows the benefits obtained (to all vehicles in the system) in low volume traffic (from 0 to 1200 veh/h), and Fig. 6(b) illustrates the benefits obtained in high-volume traffic (1200 to 2400 veh/h).
In general, all vehicles can benefit from payment game on average. When VOT is higher, the benefit is larger; and when the traffic volumes increase, the benefits increase rapidly.
We next compare our results with two reservation-based approaches that do not consider VOT or side payments, the first minimizes total delay and the second applies a first-come-firstserved service discipline. The results are depicted in Fig. 7 . The figure illustrates the competitiveness of the proposed approach as it outperforms the other two strategies in terms of mean loss, λ v , averaged over all vehicles in the system.
Impact of Untruthful VOT Reporting
If a vehicle reports a false VOT (while others report true VOTs), the benefit (or loss) can change. The change in benefit as a result of this "marginal" dis-honest reporting is given by (33) where β r v represents benefit with false VOT reporting, τ s,false v is the time saved with false reporting, τ s,honest v is the time saved with honest reporting, σ false v is the side payment made under false reporting, and σ honest v is the side payment that is made under honest reporting. Fig. 8 is a contour plot of ∆β v values associated with the different combinations of true VOT and declared VOT, when the average traffic volume is 1200 veh/h. The figure shows that the zero additional benefit lies along the diagonal. This corresponds to the case where vehicles are truthful. As we move away from the diagonal line, the benefit differences tend to be negative, which indicates that untruthfulness in VOT reporting should be dis-incentivized in the proposed framework.
Next, consider the same experiment but without side payments. The net benefits, ∆β v , in this case are depicted in Fig. 9 . The results suggest that there is always an incentive to exaggerate one's VOT. We see that basing priority on VOT but prohibiting side payments results in poor performance overall especially when the real VOTs get higher.
'Gaming' the System
In this experiment we simulate the following scenario: a vehicle that stops at an intersection ap- proach and collects payments in exchange for providing priority to vehicles in an opposing approach thereby blocking their approach. The question is: how much income can this vehicle earn from such a strategy?
In order to make the example more realistic, we set each movement to have two lanes so that one stopped vehicle will not block the approach completely. As shown in Fig. 10 , the black vehicle stops and blocks its lane, and its following vehicles need to change lanes to pass. We only take two movements and choose phase switching control in this toy sample. Vehicles in the blocked lane have higher headways and lower throughputs (less opportunity to change lane and pass) than their neighbors. Figure 10 : 'Gaming' the system to generate income.
The results, shown in Fig. 11 , illustrate a frustrating situation for the vehicle. We tested two scenar- ios, a low traffic volume scenario (400 veh/hr/lane) and a high volume scenario (800 veh/hr/lane). We see that the total income (payments received less payments made) in both cases is negative. Moreover, we see that this loss increases with VOT. This analysis does not include time, only the net side payments. The primary reason for this is that playing the game is voluntary but if one chooses to play there is always a chance that they win and will hence be required to make a payment. In essence, the stopped vehicle delays the whole movement, which results in an accumulation of vehicles along the approach creating an asymmetry at the intersection. This, in turn, results in the obstructing vehicle's approach winning the game more frequently.
Conclusions
This paper presented a new cooperative games framework for intersection traffic management that allows vehicles to trade their time directly with each other. The proposed framework is compatible with and complements a variety of existing intersection control methods. The intersection optimizes total payoffs and divides vehicles into winners, losers and indifferent-groups based on their value of time weighted time-savings. Winners pay losers to gain priority.
In addition to being complementary to existing intersection control approaches, the proposed mechanism was designed with two novel aspects in mind: first, we believe that auction based schemes have the main drawback that losers are not com-pensated and, therefore, passengers with lower values of time have little incentive to participate in such systems. Second, we believe that the proposed mechanism is robust to adversarial behavior as illustrated in the second example above. However, we can only conjecture that this is true in general. The purpose of this article is to present the mechanism. In a future paper, we will provide a through analysis of these features of the proposed system. evidence from road pricing demonstrations. 
